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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Section 2255 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code (also known 
as Masha’s Law) provides a civil right of action in federal 
district court to victims of several federal crimes, including 
sexual exploitation of a child and various child pornography 
offenses.  This case requires us to decide whether a restitution 
award for a criminal offense bars a later-filed civil claim by a 
victim under § 2255 based on that same offense.  Because we 
find that § 2255 permits such a claim, and collateral estoppel 
is not appropriate in this case, we will reverse the District 
Court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.  We 
will also vacate the District Court’s judgment setting aside a 
default entered against the defendant and remand for further 
proceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background 
 Plaintiff–Appellant Jane Doe (formerly known as 
Masha Allen) was adopted from Russia by Defendant–
Appellee Matthew Alan Mancuso when she was five years 
old.  Over the course of the following five years, Mancuso 
sexually abused Doe and documented the abuse in a series of 
photographs and videos.  Mancuso copied these media and 
distributed them through chat rooms on the internet in 
exchange for media documenting the sexual abuse of other 
children.  Mancuso’s photographs and videos became popular 
among viewers of child pornography and he was 
subsequently arrested after a law enforcement investigation 
identified him as Doe’s abuser.  Following his arrest, a 
federal grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania 
returned a two-count indictment against Mancuso:  count one 
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charged Mancuso with sexual exploitation of a minor in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); and count two charged 
Mancuso with possession of material depicting the sexual 
exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(4)(B). 
 Mancuso entered into a plea agreement.  He agreed to 
plead guilty to count one of the indictment (sexual 
exploitation) and the government agreed to dismiss count two 
(possession of child pornography).  In the plea agreement, 
Mancuso made several affirmations that would affect his 
sentence.  He “acknowledge[d] his responsibility for the 
conduct charged in Count Two of the Indictment” and 
“stipulate[d] that the conduct charged in that count may be 
considered by . . . the District Court in imposing sentence.”  
J.A. 216a.  He also agreed to pay “mandatory restitution” to 
Doe “under the Victim-Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§§3663, 3663A and 3664” in the amount of $200,000.  J.A. 
216a–217a.   
 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentencing court 
ordered Mancuso to fully fund a trust for the benefit of Doe in 
the amount of $200,000 “pursuant to Title 18, United States 
Code, Sections 2259(a) through 3663, 3663[A] and 3664.”1  
                                              
 1 18 U.S.C. § 3663 codifies the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act (“VWPA”).  The VWPA confers discretion 
upon a sentencing court in the award of restitution:  “The 
court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense 
under this title . . . may order, in addition to . . . any other 
penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution 
to any victim of such offense . . . .”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3663(a)(1)(A). 
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 18 U.S.C. § 3663A codifies the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act (“MVRA”).  The MVRA instructs a 
sentencing court to award mandatory restitution for, inter alia, 
“crime[s] of violence.”  Id. § 3663A(c). 
 18 U.S.C. § 2259 provides for mandatory restitution to 
victims of, inter alia, the crimes codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2251–2252C.  It provides:   
Notwithstanding section 3663 or 3663A, and in 
addition to any other civil or criminal penalty 
authorized by law, the court shall order 
restitution for any offense  under this chapter. 
. . . The order of restitution under this section 
shall direct the defendant to pay the victim 
(through the appropriate court mechanism) the 
full  amount of the victim’s losses as 
determined by the court . . . . [T]he term “full 
amount of the victim’s losses” includes any 
costs incurred by the victim for -- (A) medical 
services relating to physical, psychiatric, or 
psychological care; (B) physical and 
occupational therapy or rehabilitation; (C) 
necessary transportation, temporary housing, 
and child care expenses; (D) lost income; (E) 
attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; 
and (F) any other losses suffered by the victim 
as a proximate result of the offense. . . .  
A court may not decline to issue an order under 
this section because of . . . the fact that a victim 
has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for 
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Sentencing Tr. at 19, United States v. Mancuso, No. 2:03-cr-
00161-TFM (W.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2004). 
B. Procedural History 
 Ten years after Mancuso’s criminal conviction, on 
August 23, 2013, Doe filed the present civil suit under 18 
U.S.C. § 2255 against a purported class of defendants in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Doe named fourteen purported class 
representative defendants in her complaint, including 
Mancuso, and alleged that each defendant had violated a 
predicate statute under § 2255.2  Doe sought damages against 
                                                                                                     
his or her injuries from the proceeds of 
insurance or any other source.  
Id. § 2259(a), (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(4)(B).   
 Each of these statutory restitution schemes is governed 
by the procedures set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3664, which 
provides:  “In each order of restitution, the court shall order 
restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s 
losses as determined by the court and without consideration 
of the economic circumstances of the defendant.”  Id. 
§ 3664(f)(1)(A). 
 2 Before filing this appeal, Doe settled with one 
purported class representative defendant who was dismissed 
from the action with prejudice.  The District Court dismissed 
all the remaining purported class representative defendants 
except Mancuso from the action for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  The District Court did not reach the issue of 
class certification. 
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Mancuso for his possession and distribution of child 
pornography depicting her.3 
 On December 5, 2013, Mancuso was served with 
process, but over the following nine months no counsel 
entered an appearance on his behalf and he did not file a 
responsive pleading.  On September 22, 2014, the District 
Court clerk docketed Doe’s application for an entry of default 
against Mancuso.  The next day, the clerk entered a default 
against Mancuso for failure to plead or otherwise defend. 
 Following the entry of default, Mancuso’s attorney 
was admitted pro hac vice to the Eastern District of 
                                              
 3 In her First Amended Complaint, Doe erroneously 
alleged that Mancuso pleaded guilty to “possession and 
distribution of child pornography.”  J.A. 84a.  Count two of 
Mancuso’s indictment charges possession of child 
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), but that charge 
was dismissed by prosecutors pursuant to Mancuso’s plea 
agreement. 
 On appeal, Doe reiterates that she seeks damages for 
Mancuso’s possession and distribution of child pornography, 
but erroneously suggests in her briefing that both possession 
and distribution formed the basis for the charge against 
Mancuso that was dismissed.  Appellant Br. at 14–15.  
Mancuso’s indictment does not contain a distribution charge 
and counsel for Doe corrected the erroneous briefing 
statement at oral argument.  As we go on to explain, whether 
Doe is seeking damages for Mancuso’s convicted charge, 
dismissed charge, or uncharged conduct is of no import to our 
analysis. 
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Pennsylvania and promptly filed a motion for relief from 
default judgment4 and a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim.  Mancuso argued that Doe’s civil claim against him 
was barred by her prior receipt of restitution in his criminal 
case because the sentencing judge intended to fully 
compensate Doe for both the convicted and dismissed charges 
in his indictment.  The District Court agreed and, finding that 
Mancuso had a meritorious defense to Doe’s suit, set aside 
the default entered against Mancuso and granted his motion to 
dismiss.  This appeal followed. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Doe’s civil 
suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over this 
appeal from the District Court’s judgment dismissing Doe’s 
complaint against Mancuso under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Given 
the unusual procedural posture in this multi-party action, we 
take this opportunity to explain our appellate jurisdiction 
under § 1291. 
 Doe named fourteen defendants in her complaint, 
including Mancuso.  The District Court dismissed one 
defendant with prejudice pursuant to a settlement, and 
                                              
 4 Although Mancuso filed a motion for relief from 
default judgment with the District Court, the District Court 
clerk had only entered a simple default against him.  Thus, we 
will construe the District Court’s judgment granting 
Mancuso’s motion for relief from default judgment as a 
vacatur of the default. 
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dismissed all the remaining defendants except Mancuso for 
lack of personal jurisdiction without a designation that the 
dismissals were with or without prejudice.  In order to 
examine our appellate jurisdiction, we assume without 
deciding that the dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction 
were without prejudice. 
  Ordinarily, we do not have jurisdiction under 
§ 1291 of an appeal in which any defendant was dismissed 
below by the district court without prejudice.  Erie Cty. 
Retirees Ass’n v. Cty. of Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 201 (3d Cir. 
2000).  In such a case, the district court’s disposition of the 
case is not deemed sufficiently “final” within the meaning of 
§ 1291 because the plaintiff can re-file her claim against the 
dismissed defendant.  However, we have observed an 
exception to this general rule in a situation where a claim 
dismissed without prejudice cannot be re-filed, such as a 
claim for which the statute of limitations has run.  Brennan v. 
Kulick, 407 F.3d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 2005).  We have also 
observed an exception in a situation where a plaintiff 
renounces any intention to reinstate litigation on a claim 
dismissed without prejudice.  Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 
1024, 1031 (3d Cir. 1991).  In these cases, the district court’s 
disposition of the case is final because we are satisfied that 
the dismissed claims will not be re-filed. 
 These exceptions fit well within the policies of § 1291, 
which we have observed to be “minimizing the possibility of 
piecemeal appeals, according due deference to trial court 
judges, and promoting the conservation of judicial resources.”  
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 561 
(3d Cir. 1997).  If a dismissed claim will not be re-filed, there 
will be no further proceedings in front of the district court 
judge with respect to that claim and thus there is no 
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possibility of a future piecemeal appeal and the attendant 
waste of appellate judicial resources. 
 In this case, the District Court concluded that it lacked 
personal jurisdiction with respect to the dismissed defendants 
and Doe indicated in supplemental briefing her belief that the 
District Court’s dismissal operates to bar her from reasserting 
the dismissed claims in the District Court.  Accordingly, Doe 
has renounced any intention to amend her complaint in the 
District Court with respect to her allegations of jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania against the dismissed defendants.  See 
Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 
434 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that a stipulation by parties filed 
after a notice of appeal rendered an earlier district court order 
“final and appealable”).  Doe also indicated at oral argument 
an intention to re-file against the dismissed defendants in 
other courts in their home states in new actions.  Although 
Doe did not renounce any intention to re-file against the 
dismissed defendants, we see no meaningful distinction to be 
made for purposes of § 1291 between a case where a claim 
will not be re-filed at all and a case where, as here, the 
plaintiff has represented to our satisfaction that she will not 
re-file a claim in the district court at issue. 
 Our conclusion finds support in our precedent.  In 
Beazer East, we held that: 
Where the effect of a district court decision is to 
accomplish all that the parties asked the court to 
accomplish, and where the parties agree there 
cannot be—and, by court order, there will not 
be—any further proceedings in the district court 
as part of the same action, the district court’s 
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decision must be considered final for purposes 
of § 1291.   
124 F.3d at 560.  We similarly observed in GFL Advantage 
Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt that “[e]ven dismissals without prejudice 
have been held to be final and appealable if they end [ ][the] 
suit so far as the District Court was concerned . . . .”  272 
F.3d 189, 198 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (second and third alterations 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trent 
v. Dial Med. of Fla., Inc., 33 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 1994)).5    
                                              
 5 We recognized an exception to this principle of 
finality in Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 
470 (3d Cir. 2006) for cases where district court proceedings 
have concluded but may be reinstated in the future such that 
we treat the later action as part of the prior action for 
purposes of determining finality.  In Morton, the district court 
had dismissed claims against several defendants without 
prejudice pending the outcome of non-binding alternative 
dispute resolution (“ADR”) and expressly noted that the 
dismissed claims could be re-filed if the ADR failed.  Id. at 
478.  In finding a lack of appellate jurisdiction, we concluded 
that the district court’s disposition of the case was not final 
because, even though the plaintiff’s potential re-filing against 
the dismissed defendants would technically occur in a 
separate action, any “subsequently-initiated litigation 
effectively will be part of the original action and controversy, 
albeit with a new caption and docket number.”  Id. at 479.   
 The present case does not fall within the exception in 
Morton.  If Doe re-files against the dismissed defendants, the 
new actions will be filed in other courts and so the District 
Court here has “accomplish[ed] all that the parties asked the 
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 Other circuits have endorsed this principle as well.  
See Hope v. Klabal, 457 F.3d 784, 790 (8th Cir. 2006) (“After 
the voluntary dismissal [without prejudice], there was nothing 
left for the district court to resolve, and the suit had ended as 
far as that court was concerned, thereby creating a final 
judgment.”); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 406 F.3d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he fact ‘[t]hat the dismissal was without prejudice 
to filing another suit does not make the cause unappealable, 
for denial of relief and dismissal of the case ended this suit as 
far as the District Court was concerned.’” (second alteration 
in original) (quoting United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 
336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1 (1949))); De Tie v. Orange Cty., 152 
F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that an order 
dismissing an action without prejudice was final for purposes 
of appeal because “[t]he action . . . [was] over as far as the 
district court [was] concerned”). 
 In assessing whether we have appellate jurisdiction, 
we give § 1291 a “practical rather than technical 
construction.”  Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 
381 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Carr v. Am. Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 678 (3d Cir. 
                                                                                                     
court to accomplish.”  Id. at 479 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Beazer E., 124 F.3d at 560).  Accordingly, there is 
no “potential for the district court to revisit the case,” id. at 
480, and so any later actions filed by Doe in other courts 
cannot fairly be considered part of the present action.  If any 
litigation takes place with respect to the dismissed defendants, 
it will occur in truly separate actions in other courts. 
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1994)).  Here, Doe’s stipulation that she will only re-file the 
dismissed claims in other actions in other courts satisfies us 
that the District Court proceedings in this case are concluded 
and will not be reinstated.  See Beazer E., 124 F.3d at 557 
(“[A]n appellate court must determine whether, at the time it 
is examining its jurisdiction, there remain unresolved issues 
to be adjudicated in the district court.”).  As such, the policies 
underlying § 1291 are not implicated—there is no risk of 
further proceedings on the dismissed claims in front of the 
District Court and thus no risk of this Court hearing 
piecemeal appeals from the District Court proceeding.6 
 Thus, we conclude that the District Court’s disposition 
with respect to the dismissed defendants in this action is final 
within the meaning of § 1291 and permits us to hear Doe’s 
appeal.7 
                                              
 6 In fact, based on the allegations in Doe’s complaint, 
all of the dismissed defendants’ home states appear to be 
outside of the Third Circuit and thus any future appellate 
proceedings from the re-filed actions would not take place in 
this Court.  Denying appellate jurisdiction here would leave 
us in the bizarre situation of waiting for each of Doe’s twelve 
future suits to reach final judgment in other Circuits before 
we hear her present appeal—even though those suits would 
have no effect whatsoever on her appeal before this Court.  
This result would serve none of § 1291’s purposes to avoid 
piecemeal appeals, accord deference to the District Court, and 
conserve judicial resources.  
 7 Mancuso argues that the District Court’s dismissal of 
Doe’s claim against him cannot be a final order because the 
District Court did not issue a Rule 54(b) certification.  Rule 
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 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
order dismissing Doe’s complaint for failure to state a claim.  
Rea v. Federated Inv’rs, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 2010).  In 
our review, we accept all factual allegations as true, construe 
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint, Doe may be entitled to relief.  Id.  As a judgment 
setting aside an entry of default is within the District Court’s 
discretion, we review that judgment for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 
194–95 (3d Cir. 1984). 
                                                                                                     
54(b) provides:  “[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, 
but fewer than all, . . . parties only if the court expressly 
determines that there is no just reason for delay.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 54(b).  
 Rule 54(b), by its own terms, applies only if a district 
court enters final judgment with respect to one defendant, but 
does not enter final judgment with respect to the remaining 
defendants.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 
435 (1956).  As we conclude above, we consider the District 
Court’s dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction in this case 
to constitute final judgments for § 1291 purposes and thus 
Rule 54(b) is not applicable.  See Beazer E., 124 F.3d at 561 
n.8 (“While unresolved claims existed, there were no 
unresolved claims before [the district court] that required 
further district court proceedings.  For this reason, Rule 
54(b) certification was unnecessary to allow [the] appeal.”). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
 
 We first examine the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and its 
place in Congress’s remedial scheme for child victims of sex 
crimes.  We then address whether collateral estoppel is 
applicable to Doe’s claim.8  Finally, we turn to the default 
entered against Mancuso in the court below. 
A. Section 2255 and Congress’s Remedial Scheme 
 In construing a statute, we are guided by the principle 
that “every exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an 
examination of the plain language of the statute.”  Rosenberg 
v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001).  When the 
statutory language is unambiguous, our inquiry is complete 
and we ordinarily do not consider statutory purpose or 
legislative history.  S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2013).  In such a case, only 
in the “rare circumstances” where a “literal application of the 
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of its drafters . . . or where the result would be so 
bizarre that Congress could not have intended it” is further 
inquiry warranted.  In re Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 346 (3d Cir. 
1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
                                              
 8 On appeal, the parties dispute whether the District 
Court was correct in finding that the sentencing court’s 
restitution order compensated Doe for both the convicted and 
dismissed charge in Mancuso’s indictment.  Because we find 
that § 2255 permits a victim to bring a suit based on a 
predicate offense even where she has received restitution for 
that offense, we need not reach that issue. 
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 The operative provision of § 2255 provides: 
Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of 
a violation of section 1589, 1590, 1591, 
2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 
2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title 
and who suffers personal injury as a result of 
such violation, regardless of whether the injury 
occurred while such person was a minor, may 
sue in any appropriate United States District 
Court and shall recover the actual damages such 
person sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including a reasonable attorney’s fee.  Any 
person as described in the preceding sentence 
shall be deemed to have sustained damages of 
no less than $150,000 in value.  
18 U.S.C. § 2255(a).9  The language of the statute makes 
clear that the civil right of action it provides is available to 
                                              
 9 The civil right of action in § 2255 was first passed in 
1986.  Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-500, § 703(a), 100 Stat. 1783, 1783-74 to -75 (1986).  It 
was amended in 1998 to cover a wider array of predicate 
crimes.  Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 605, 112 Stat. 2974, 2984 
(1998).  It was amended again in 2006 (at which time it 
became known as Masha’s Law) to increase minimum 
statutory damages from $50,000 to $150,000 and make clear 
that an adult could bring suit based on a predicate crime that 
took place while she was a minor.  Masha’s Law, Pub. L. No. 
109-248, § 707, 120 Stat. 587, 650 (2006).  It was amended a 
final time in 2013 to again widen the array of predicate 
crimes and increase the statute of limitations from six years to 
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“any person” who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation 
of a predicate statute resulting in personal injury. 
 We faced a similar question of statutory interpretation 
in United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  In that case, the federal government had entered 
into a consent decree with a group of defendants involving 
the cleanup of a parcel of land containing hazardous 
materials.  Id. at 1178.  The government later entered into 
another consent decree with a second group of defendants 
involving the cleanup of that same site.  Id. at 1179.  The 
trustees of the parcel of land, on behalf of the first group of 
defendants, moved to intervene under CERCLA in the 
government’s second suit.  Id.  The relevant provision of 
CERCLA provided:   
In any action commenced under this chapter or 
under the Solid Waste Disposal Act in a court 
of the United States, any person may intervene 
as a matter of right when such person claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and 
is so situated that the disposition of the action 
may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the 
person’s ability to protect that interest . . . . 
Id. at 1180 n.6 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i)). 
 The government, citing legislative history, contended 
that intervention was limited to persons who sought to raise 
health or environmental concerns.  Id. at 1180–81.  In 
                                                                                                     
ten years.  Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 
2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 1212(a), 127 Stat. 54, 143 (2013).   
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rejecting that limited construction of the statute, we observed 
that the plain language of the intervention provision did not 
so limit or qualify the right to intervene.  Id. at 1180.  We 
expressed doubt that “Congress would have used the phrase 
‘any person may intervene’ or ‘any action under this chapter’ 
if it had intended to restrict intervention to only those persons 
raising a particular, but unidentified, claim.”  Id. 
 Similarly here, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in no way 
limits the availability of the civil right of action to cases in 
which a victim has not been compensated in the past by a 
restitution order.  We therefore find the statute to be 
unambiguous for our purposes.  Cf. Doe v. Boland, 630 F.3d 
491, 498 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting an argument that § 2255 
was not intended to cover an expert witness’s computer-aided 
creation of child pornography images because “the words 
Congress chose [in § 2255] offer no basis for drawing this 
kind of line, and it is not our place to second guess the 
judgment Congress put into law”).     
 Looking beyond the text of the statute here to limit the 
statute’s application is not appropriate where allowing a civil 
action under § 2255 to a child victim of a sex crime after her 
receipt of criminal restitution cannot fairly be labelled a 
bizarre result.  In fact, such a construction of § 2255 is 
consistent with Congress’s remedial scheme for child victims 
of sex crimes.  The procedures governing the award of 
mandatory restitution under § 2259 provide:  “Any amount 
paid to a victim under an order of restitution shall be reduced 
by any amount later recovered as compensatory damages for 
the same loss by the victim in . . . any Federal civil 
19 
 
proceeding . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2).10  They further 
provide:  “A conviction of a defendant for an offense 
involving the act giving rise to an order of restitution shall 
estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of 
that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding . . . 
brought by the victim.”  Id. § 3664(l).   
 With these provisions, Congress not only contemplated 
that a victim who had received restitution could file a 
subsequent civil action, but also provided procedures for that 
very situation.  These provisions ensure that a victim will not 
have to re-litigate the conduct forming the basis of a criminal 
conviction in a subsequent civil action and a defendant will 
not be required to pay double damages for the same loss if a 
subsequent civil action is successful.  We can conceive of 
                                              
 10 The District Court concluded that several federal 
appellate cases examining § 3664(j)(2) stand for the 
proposition that the restitution laws do not permit double 
recovery by victims.  Doe v. Hesketh, 77 F. Supp. 3d 440, 450 
(E.D. Pa. 2015).  However, from that simple proposition, the 
District Court erroneously concluded that the MVRA does 
not permit victims to bring a civil suit after a restitution award 
has been made.  Id. 
 As Doe correctly observes, § 3664(j)(2) does not 
operate to bar a later-filed civil suit.  To the contrary, it 
expressly contemplates such a suit and, by providing a set-off, 
ensures that any duplicative recovery in such a suit does not 
violate the common law principle against double recovery.  
We do not now decide to what extent, if any, the sentencing 
court’s restitution order compensated Doe for the “same 
loss,” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2), that underlies her civil claim. 
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several reasons for Congress’s determination that a victim 
who has already received restitution should be permitted a 
subsequent civil suit. 
 Congress may have wanted to give victims a chance to 
prove a higher level of damages than that which a sentencing 
court found during a limited factfinding proceeding as part of 
sentencing.11  A victim’s participation in a sentencing court’s 
determination of restitution is limited to conferring with the 
government, id. § 3664(d)(1), submitting information to a 
probation officer, id. § 3664(d)(2)(A)(vi), or potentially 
providing testimony at the sentencing court’s discretion, id. 
§ 3664(d)(4).12  A subsequent civil action allows a victim to 
fully litigate the question of her damages to achieve 
compensation for the full amount of her damages.  And it 
allows a victim the opportunity to prove those damages in 
front of a jury—a procedure that is unavailable in the context 
of criminal restitution in sentencing proceedings, id. 
§ 3664(e).  See U.S. Const. amend. VII; Curtis v. Loether, 
                                              
 11 The parties dispute whether the sentencing court’s 
restitution order compensated Doe for her full damages.  We 
will not resolve this question of fact at this stage of the 
proceedings. 
 12 The Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”) provides 
victims with additional rights in the restitution process, 
including the right to be “reasonably heard” at sentencing and 
the right to “full and timely restitution.”  18 U.S.C. § 3771.  
However, the CVRA was passed into law on October 30, 
2004, which was over eight months after Mancuso’s 
sentencing.  Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 
§ 102(a), 118 Stat. 2260, 2261 (2004).   
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415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (“The Seventh Amendment 
[applies] to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a 
jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and 
remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the 
ordinary courts of law.”). 
 The opportunity for a victim to fully litigate the 
question of her damages in a civil action is even more 
important for those victims who choose not to participate in a 
sentencing court’s determination of restitution.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3664(g)(1) (“No victim shall be required to participate in 
any phase of a restitution order.”).  By permitting a later civil 
suit, Congress may have wanted to shield victims from 
participating in the criminal sentencing of their victimizers 
while the victims are so close in time to the damaging effects 
of the offense.  This concern is particularly acute in child 
pornography cases as victims are children who have often 
suffered horrific abuse and, as such, it may not be desirable to 
have them participate in a sentencing proceeding.13  Section 
2255’s statute of limitations protects such children by 
providing an extension in cases where a “victim is still a 
                                              
 13 Congress’s recognition that the same may be true in 
some civil suits is reflected in § 2255’s statutory damages 
provision, which allows victims to obtain $150,000 in 
compensation without participating in a damages hearing if 
they so choose.  See Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 882 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (“The point of a minimum-damages requirement 
[in § 2255] is to allow victims of child pornography to 
recover without having to endure potentially damaging 
damages hearings.  Were it otherwise, a fresh damages 
hearing might inflict fresh wounds, increasing the child’s 
suffering . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).   
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minor when the . . . statute of limitations would otherwise 
have run.”  Stephens v. Clash, 796 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 
2015); see 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b). 
 Civil actions, such as that provided in § 2255, also 
allow a victim to recover additional categories of damages not 
compensable as part of restitution.  For example, a civil 
action allows a victim to recover for non-pecuniary damages, 
such as pain and suffering or mental and emotional distress, 
which may not be available under the restitution statutes.  See 
United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192 n.9 (D. Me. 
2009) (expressing doubt that the mandatory restitution 
provision in § 2259 was intended to permit restitution for pain 
and suffering); Melanie Reid & Curtis L. Collier, When Does 
Restitution Become Retribution?, 64 Okla. L. Rev. 653, 661 
& n.31 (2012). 
 Certainly Congress could not have intended in 
providing a remedy the opposite situation where § 2255 was 
only available to victims who had not previously received 
restitution.  Section 2259 provides for mandatory restitution 
to victims of the crimes codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–
2252A, see 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), which are all predicate 
offenses listed in § 2255 as forming the basis for a civil claim, 
see 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a).  If we accept the District Court’s 
conclusion that an award of restitution bars a later-filed claim 
under § 2255, then we would render § 2255 nothing more 
than a “dead letter” with respect to those predicate offenses.  
United States v. Jersey Shore State Bank, 781 F.2d 974, 977 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
 Nor is our construction of the statute “demonstrably at 
odds with the intentions of its drafters.”  In re Segal, 57 F.3d 
at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Taylor v. 
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Freeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 424 (3d Cir. 1991)).  At 
oral argument, counsel for Mancuso suggested that Congress 
intended § 2255 to be available only to those victims who had 
yet to receive payment in satisfaction of a prior criminal 
restitution award.  However, Mancuso has pointed to no 
legislative history or other statutory provisions that evince 
such an intent.  Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress could 
have reasonably concluded a victim would be more 
successful in obtaining satisfaction of a civil judgment than a 
criminal restitution order.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3613A(a)(1) 
(permitting a district court to revoke a defendant’s probation 
or term of supervised release, resentence a defendant, hold a 
defendant in contempt of court, enter an injunction against a 
defendant, or order a sale of property of a defendant in order 
to obtain compliance with a restitution order). 
 An examination of the legislative history of § 2255 
does not provide any clear insight into whether Congress 
intended the civil right of action in § 2255 to be available to 
victims who had already received criminal restitution.  
Congressional findings at the time of § 2255’s enactment 
describe a “lack [of] effective remedies under Federal law” 
for “exploitation victims.”  Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 702(3), 100 Stat. 1783, 1783-
74 (1986).  However, these findings were made prior to 
Congress’s enactment of § 2259, which provided mandatory 
restitution for the “full amount of [a] victim’s losses” to 
victims of the child pornography predicate offenses listed in 
§ 2255.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1). 
 Statements by legislators at the time of recent 
amendments to § 2255 similarly do not speak on this 
question, but suggest that the law’s general purpose is to 
provide both compensation to child pornography victims and 
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a measure of deterrence to possessors and distributors of child 
pornography.  See 152 Cong. Rec. H5705-01 (daily ed. July 
25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Gingrey) (“Currently, a person 
who illegally downloads music faces penalties in civil court 
that are three times as harsh as a person who downloads child 
pornography.  This horrible inequity was the inspiration 
behind the introduction of Masha’s Law . . . .”); see also 151 
Cong. Rec. S14187-03 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2005) (statement of 
Sen. Kerry) (“This legislation increases the civil penalties 
recoverable by victims of child sexual exploitation, including 
internet child pornography, to at least $150,000.  This 
increased penalty will serve as a deterrent to those who 
disseminate and possess child pornography, as well as a 
means of compensating victims of this terrible abuse.”).  We 
are satisfied that our construction of the statute to allow a 
victim who has received criminal restitution to bring a civil 
suit furthers these goals. 
 We therefore hold that 18 U.S.C. § 2255 permits a 
victim to bring a civil claim for the violation of a predicate 
statute even where that victim has previously received 
criminal restitution for the same violation of that statute for 
her purported full damages.14 
                                              
 14 In reaching this holding, we recognize that the 
“amount paid to [the] victim under [the] order of restitution 
shall be reduced by any amount later recovered as 
compensatory damages for the same loss by the victim” in the 
civil action.  18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2). 
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B. Collateral Estoppel15 
 Collateral estoppel prevents the re-litigation of a 
factual or legal issue that was litigated in an earlier 
proceeding.  When examining the preclusive effect of a prior 
federal court determination, we apply federal law principles 
of collateral estoppel.  See Paramount Aviation Corp. v. 
Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 145 (3d Cir. 1999).  Collateral estoppel 
is appropriate where:  “(1) the identical issue was decided in a 
prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the 
merits; (3) the party against whom the bar is asserted was a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and 
(4) the party against whom the bar is asserted had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question.”  Del. River 
Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of Police, 290 F.3d 567, 573 
n.10 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare 
Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 1992)).  As 
Doe was neither a party to Mancuso’s prior criminal 
proceeding nor in privity with a party, and did not have a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the question of her damages, 
we will not apply collateral estoppel to prevent Doe from 
                                              
 15 Although the District Court did not explicitly 
examine the collateral estoppel effect of the sentencing 
court’s determination of Doe’s losses, we find it desirable to 
examine collateral estoppel in this case since we are uncertain 
as to the legal principle under which the District Court found 
Doe’s claim was barred.  See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 303 n.73 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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litigating the question of her damages based on Mancuso’s 
criminal conduct.16 
 Since Doe was not a party to Mancuso’s criminal 
sentencing proceeding, collateral estoppel will only be 
appropriate if she was in privity with the government.  We 
assess privity under the rubric laid out by the Supreme Court 
in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).  See Nationwide 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. George V. Hamilton, Inc., 571 F.3d 299, 
310–12 (3d Cir. 2009).  A nonparty will be found to be in 
privity with a party to a proceeding where: 
                                              
 16 With respect to the first factor of the collateral 
estoppel test (identity of issue), collateral estoppel would only 
be appropriate if Doe sought to litigate an issue that was 
previously decided by the sentencing court in Mancuso’s 
criminal proceeding.  As we explain supra note 8, the parties 
dispute whether the sentencing court’s restitution order 
compensated Doe for her damages with respect to the charge 
against Mancuso that was dismissed.  Given our conclusion 
that Doe is not collaterally estopped on other grounds, we do 
not reach this question. 
 As to the second factor (finality of judgment), the 
sentencing court’s restitution order is sufficiently “final” to be 
accorded preclusive effect because it conclusively determined 
Mancuso’s restitution obligation.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o) 
(“A sentence that imposes an order of restitution is a final 
judgment . . . .”); Henglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 
260 F.3d 201, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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1) the nonparty agrees to be bound by the 
determination of issues in an action between 
others; 
2) a substantive legal relationship—i.e.[,] 
traditional privity—exists that binds the 
nonparty; 
3) the nonparty was “adequately represented by 
someone with the same interests who [wa]s a 
party”; 
4) the nonparty assumes control over the 
litigation in which the judgment is rendered; 
5) the nonparty attempts to bring suit as the 
designated representative of someone who was 
a party in the prior litigation; [or], 
6) the nonparty falls under a special statutory 
scheme that “expressly foreclos[es] successive 
litigation by nonlitigants.”  
Id. at 312–13 (second and fourth alterations in original) 
(quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894–95).  Doe is not in privity 
with the government under the two categories of privity 
applicable to this case—category three and category six. 
 The interests of a victim and the government in a 
restitution determination are not sufficiently similar for a 
finding of privity.  A victim’s interest in the context of 
restitution is undoubtedly to achieve the maximum amount of 
compensation for herself permissible under the law.  A victim 
such as Doe may be willing to assume the time and cost to 
litigate the full extent of her damages in a trial as Doe has 
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chosen to do in her civil suit.  By contrast, the interests of the 
government in the restitution context are necessarily affected 
by its responsibility to “represent the interest of society as a 
whole.”  Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202–03 (1979); 
see, e.g., Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 186 n.3 (noting an “obvious 
conflict” between the position of two victims and the 
government in briefing before the court with respect to 
whether the mandatory restitution provision in § 2259 
contains a proximate cause requirement for compensable 
losses).   
 Accordingly, the government has an interest in 
securing a plea agreement that is palatable to the defendant in 
order to avoid a lengthy and costly criminal trial in which it 
may not prevail and an interest in achieving speedy 
punishment for the purpose of deterrence.  See Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (“For the State there 
are . . .  advantages—the more promptly imposed punishment 
after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the 
objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, 
scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved . . . 
.”).  These are not necessarily interests that the victim shares.  
See Nationwide, 571 F.3d at 313 (“Under the ‘adequate 
representation’ exception, the interests of the party and 
nonparty must be squarely aligned . . . .”). 
 These varied interests are balanced by the government 
as it decides whether to accept a plea agreement with a given 
amount of restitution and render the government necessarily 
less interested in litigating extensively to have Mancuso pay 
the maximum amount of restitution permissible under the 
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law.17  The effect of these varied interests are particularly 
acute in the present situation as the child victim in this case 
had a limited ability to advocate on her behalf and instead 
relied on a restitution amount that was derived from a plea 
agreement negotiated between Mancuso and the government. 
 Nor can we find privity based on a conclusion that 18 
U.S.C. § 2255 or the restitution statutes expressly foreclose a 
subsequent civil claim under § 2255 once a victim has 
received criminal restitution.  As we explain above, the text 
of § 2255 does not contain any indication that its application 
is limited to those victims who did not previously receive 
restitution.  And, far from expressly foreclosing subsequent 
civil claims, the restitution laws expressly contemplate such 
claims.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2); id. § 3664(l); cf. EEOC v. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1990) (“If 
Congress did not believe that the individual’s claim would be 
adequately pressed by the EEOC, it would surely have 
preserved the individual’s right to bring suit either during or 
after the EEOC suit.”). 
 Under the final factor of the collateral estoppel test, 
Doe did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
question of her damages in Mancuso’s sentencing proceeding.  
                                              
 17 While the sentencing court had an independent 
statutory obligation under the restitution laws to ensure that 
Doe was fully compensated by the restitution order, see 18 
U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A), the privity inquiry is confined to a 
determination of whether the government had the same 
interest as Doe in litigating the question. 
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During sentencing, the government is the party that advocates 
for its desired level of restitution.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).  
As Doe was not a party to the prior criminal sentencing 
proceeding, she had a limited opportunity to influence the 
process.  As we explain above, Doe’s participation in the 
restitution process was limited by § 3664 to conferring with 
the government, providing information to a probation officer 
as to the extent of her losses, or providing testimony to the 
sentencing court only if the sentencing court determined that 
such testimony was warranted.  See United States v. Brown, 
744 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he victim is not a party 
to a sentencing hearing and therefore has only a limited 
ability to influence the outcome.  The victim cannot control 
the presentation of evidence during . . . the sentencing hearing 
and is not even guaranteed the right to testify about the extent 
of his losses.”).  There were no other provisions of the 
restitution statutes that permitted Doe to influence the 
sentencing court’s restitution decision.  See United States v. 
Stoerr, 695 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 We remain mindful of the fact that, at its core, 
collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine.  See Jean 
Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 
244, 255 (3d Cir. 2006).  Thus, in addition to the four-factor 
test for collateral estoppel, we recognize the equitable 
exceptions to the general rule of collateral estoppel codified 
in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.  Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 288 F.3d 519, 
525 (3d Cir. 2002).  Relevant for our purposes is the equitable 
exception that applies where “[t]he party against whom 
preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have 
obtained review of the judgment in the initial action.”  
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28.  In this case, Doe 
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was not able to obtain appellate review because she was not a 
party to the criminal proceeding during which Mancuso was 
ordered to pay restitution.18  See Stoerr, 695 F.3d at 276–277; 
Brown, 744 F.2d at 910.  Despite the fact that Doe may have 
believed, as she argues here, that the restitution award of 
$200,000 did not compensate her for her full losses, she was 
not permitted to appeal the sentencing court’s award to this 
Court and thus cannot be bound by its determination. 
 Under the facts of this case, where the interests of Doe 
and the government were not squarely aligned, she had a 
limited ability to participate in the determination of her 
restitution in front of the sentencing court, and she had no 
                                              
 18 We have on one occasion allowed a purported 
victim to directly appeal a restitution order, but without an 
examination of the purported victim’s standing to appeal.  See 
United States v. Kones, 77 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 1996).  We later 
disavowed our assumption of jurisdiction in that decision, 
noting that a “‘drive-by jurisdictional ruling[],’ in which 
jurisdiction ‘ha[s] been assumed by the parties, and . . . 
assumed without discussion by the [c]ourt,’ does not create 
binding precedent.”  Stoerr, 695 F.3d at 277 n.5 (alterations 
in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). 
 The CVRA accorded crime victims the right to petition 
the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus based on a 
denial of the right to be reasonably heard at sentencing or a 
denial of the right to full restitution.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3771(d)(3).  However, as noted supra note 12, the 
sentencing court’s restitution order pre-dated the passage of 
the CVRA. 
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ability to seek appellate review of that determination, we are 
of the firm belief that the application of collateral estoppel 
would simply be inequitable and would offend the “deep-
rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own 
day in court.”19  Nationwide, 571 F.3d at 314 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 
517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).  For these reasons, and because 
the collateral estoppel test and exception set forth above 
counsel against the application of the doctrine, we will not 
apply collateral estoppel to bar Doe’s claim. 
 
 
 
                                              
 19 Moreover, we are particularly loath to apply 
collateral estoppel to disrupt Congress’s remedial scheme 
where Congress has expressly provided for estoppel with 
respect to one aspect of a later-filed civil claim, but declined 
to provide for estoppel with respect to a victim’s damages.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(l) (“A conviction of a defendant for an 
offense involving the act giving rise to an order of restitution 
shall estop the defendant from denying the essential 
allegations of that offense in any subsequent Federal civil 
proceeding . . . brought by the victim.”); cf. Taylor, 553 U.S. 
at 903 (“Congress’ provision for FOIA suits with no statutory 
constraint on successive actions counsels against judicial 
imposition of constraints through extraordinary application of 
the common law of preclusion.”).  “The courts should not jam 
judicially created doctrines such as res judicata into the gears 
of Congress’ carefully crafted statutory machinery.”  United 
States v. Barnette, 10 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1994). 
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C. Relief from Entry of Default 
 A judgment setting aside the entry of default is within 
a district court’s discretion, $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 
F.2d at 194–95, and may only be made “for good cause,” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 55(c).  In exercising that discretion and 
determining whether “good cause” exists, we have instructed 
district courts to consider the following factors: “(1) whether 
the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has 
a meritorious defense; [and] (3) whether the default was the 
result of the defendant’s culpable conduct.”  $55,518.05 in 
U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d at 195.   
 The District Court rested its judgment setting aside the 
entry of default against Mancuso solely on the finding that 
Mancuso had a meritorious defense—specifically, that the 
prior criminal restitution award barred Doe’s present civil 
claim.  The District Court did not address whether Doe would 
be prejudiced by a vacatur of default or whether the default 
was the result of Mancuso’s culpable conduct.  Given that we 
find Doe’s claim is not barred by the prior criminal restitution 
award, and the District Court made no additional findings 
with respect to its vacatur of default for us to review, we will 
vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand to the 
District Court for consideration anew of whether there is 
“good cause” for setting aside the default entered against 
Mancuso. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court dismissing Doe’s complaint 
against Mancuso, vacate the judgment of the District Court 
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setting aside the default entered against Mancuso, and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
